Spring Paper 17 EN | springeurop.eu

Springeurop Paper 17

European security and defence strategy:An urgent call for action!

The Situation:

Europe is facing new serious and immediate security threats that have been largely overlooked since the Cold War's end.

The preservation of our way of life, freedom, democracy, and values hinges on maintaining robust security.

The cost of proactive security measures is far lower than the price of insecurity.

Despite the NATO commitment to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense (compared to 7% for Russia), only ten European Union (EU) Member States meet this target. The U.S. spent 3.49% of GDP on defense in 2023, as second largest contributor in relative terms after Poland. It may shift to a more isolationist policy and Pacific-focused strategy after its next elections.

Defense spending in Europe is inefficient due to cumbersome procurement processes and a lack of interoperability between the predominant U.S.-manufactured and the European defense equipment, particularly for key countries like France, Germany, and the UK.

European nations are heavily dependent on U.S. defense manufacturers, with 78% of EU Member States' armament purchases coming from outside the Union, mainly from the U.S. Additionally, European-produced weapons often rely on U.S. components, subject to prior authorization from Washington under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Europe lacks a unified political and industrial defense strategy, and its fragmented funding isn't fully integrated into the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

Recommendations:

1. Strengthening Europe's Role in NATO: While EU Member States’ participation in NATO remains crucial, Europe must establish a credible and sovereign defense role within the alliance. This requires gradually transferring security and defense competencies to EU institutions, with decision-making based on the co-decision procedure and broad implementing powers granted to the European Commission.

2. Implementing the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS): The EDIS proposal, adopted in March 2024, mandates that at least 40% of military equipment be jointly procured by Member States, with a minimum of 50% manufactured within the EU (increasing to 60% by 2035). These targets should be made compulsory.

3. Reducing Dependence on U.S. Components: To retain genuine sovereignty, Europe must replace U.S. components in its domestically produced armaments with European-made alternatives.

4. Enhancing Cybersecurity and Hybrid Warfare Defenses: Europe must ensure the autonomy of its defense mechanisms to protect against hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks from both external and internal sources that threaten its democracies.

5. Streamlining Defense Procurement: defense procurement rules across Member States should be harmonized and made less bureaucratic to foster a strong European armaments industry. Long-term contracts are necessary to encourage industry investment.

6. Coordinating defense Programs: Each Member State should identify its defense priorities and specific skills, identify which programs they are prepared to participate in, then develop a coherent armaments policy. A single leader should be appointed for each project and should be responsible for the coordination among all participants.

7. Reorienting defense Funding Sources: defense companies should be funded through:
- National budgets, especially in countries with large arsenals.
- The European Investment Bank (EIB), which has extensive experience in long-term financing for private industries.
- A European defense Fund, possibly managed by the EIB.
- Commercial banks, with relaxed Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) rules to facilitate lending.

8. Maximizing Existing EU Funds: In the discussion around new European loans, or the need to increase the Union’s own resources or to increase Member State contributions, the EU must prioritize fully utilizing available, unspent, or non-essential funds from other programs.

9. Better streamlining defense Budgets: Europe must better define its defense and security strategy and quantify the budgets needed to achieve its objectives in line with the existing defense programs of the Member States. An improved EU budgetary discipline is critical to balance economic investment, innovation, and defense spending, which are necessary for improving European competitiveness.

10. Improving Europe's Geopolitical Credibility: The new European executive must consider both defense and security challenges, while also becoming a credible geopolitical player by raising annual economic growth from 1.7% to around 2.5% over the next five years.

11. Encouraging Military Cooperation: Voluntary military cooperation among Member States on a case-by-case basis should be encouraged to bypass the unanimity rule, which hampers decision-making. This rule should be abolished for common defense matters. Full interoperability and integration of European military equipment and air traffic control systems is essential.

12. Expanding the European Rapid Intervention Force: The current European rapid intervention task force of 5,000 personnel is insufficient. This should be increased to at least 50,000, operational by the end of 2025. Deployment decisions should be made by a qualified majority, with a clearly defined chain of command and operational guidelines.

October 2024